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B.: Motor Vehicles--Constructive Service of Process on Nonresidents--

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
limits."3 The difficulty in applying this rule arises from the obvious
problem of determining what statements are statements of fact and
what are statements of opinion. The dissenting opinion in the instant case seems to have overlooked this distinction and based its
remarks upon the broad social policy of free criticism of public officials. The practical test, developed by the courts to determine
whether a statement is one of fact, is whether a reasonable man
would justifiably have believed upon reading the statement that it
was a fact or merely an opinion based upon stated facts. 14 It appears under this test that the statements in question, or at least
some of them, were statements of fact, allegedly false, and therefore, there would be no reasonable room for a defense on the ground
that the statements made were within the realm of fair comment.!
I. D. J., JR.
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AG-NT. - The employment by defendant, a nonresident corporation, of a Georgia citizen for sales work in Georgia contemplated
the use of such resident's duly licensed and registered automobile
in the conduct of the nonresident's business. For injuries incurred
in an accident resulting from the agent's negligent operation of his
automobile in the course of his employment, plaintiff instituted this
action against the employer by service on the Secretary of State.
Held, that the employment was not a statutory appointment of the
Secretary of State as defendant's agent to receive service of process.
Wood v. Win. B. Reilly & Co., Inc.'
The court points out that the vehicle was being operated on
local highways not by virtue of privileges bestowed on the nonresident by the statute,' but under the rights of an owner of a duly
13 Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 191 (1878) ; Alderson v. Kahle, 73 W.
Va. 690, 80 S. E. 1109 (1914); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass.
238, 28 N. E. 1, 13 L. R. A. 97: (1891).
',Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N. W. 110, 51 L. R. A. 451 (1900);
HARP'E,

ToRTs § 251.

15 Supra n. 9, wherein the court held the statements were not libelous per
so and added, by way of obiter dicta, that anyway they were privileged. Privilege is a distinct doctrine from fair comment.
140 F. Supp. 507 (N. D. Ga. 1941).
2 GA. CODE AN-N. § 68-801 (in substance providing that acceptance by any
nonresident, including corporations, of the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle in Georgia shall be deemed equivalent to appointment of the Secretary
of State as attorney to receive service of process in any action or proceeding).
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licensed and registered vehicle. Rhode Island, on identical facts,
has held that the resident owner-agent's right to operate the vehicle
is conferred by the state and is not dependent upon the consent
of the employer.3 Other jurisdictions, construing slightly different
statutes,4 have concurred in result by holding that the statute does
not apply to a nonresident employer where the car is being
operated by its owner who is a resident, or a nonresident.6
The problem has not yet arisen in West Virginia. Legislation
of the type involved is generally regarded as in derogation of the
common law and the rule of strict construction applied.7 Assuming
that West Virginia would so regard it, the further question arises
whether our court would concur with the principal case. Comparison of the statutes of West Virginia8 and Georgia reveals a
striking similarity of nature and design, such that a different construction by' our court could not well be reconciled. The statute
obviously aims at relieving local citizens from the inconvenience attendant on the necessity of resorting to other jurisdictions for relief for injuries resulting from the operation of automobiles by
nonresidents. When the operator is a local citizen driving his
own automobile, duly licensed and registered under state laws,
can his being an agent for a nonresident be deemed sufficient to call
into operation a statute designed to benefit an aggrieved citizen,
but not to prejudice the rights of a nonresident? The decisions
so far answer in the negative, thus furnishing West Virginia per.
suasive precedent for adopting that construction. 10
G. S. B.

PLF4EDING - NONJOINDEr OF CONTRACT PLAINTnFFS. - A and
B were the joint promisees of an insurance policy issued by D. A
right of action accrued under the policy and A prosecuted the action in his own name after B refused to join with him. Held, that
3 Olesas v. Hurley Mach. Co., 52 R. L 69, 157 Atl. 426 (1931).
4 N. Y. VEHoLE & TRAnrc LAw § 52; Micr. Comtp. LAws (Mason Supp.

1935) § 4790.
zWallace v. Smith, 238 App. Div. 599, 265 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1933).
6 Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N. W. 557 (1933).
7 Flynn v. Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (1935).
s W. VrA. Rzv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 3, § 31 (in substance providing
that operation by a nonresident, or his agent, of a motor vehicle in West Virginia shall be deemed equivalent to appointment of the state auditor as attorney to receive service of process).
9 Supra n. 2.
10 The constitutionality of such statutes was sustained in Hess v. Pawloski,

274 U. S. 90, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
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